Editorial -15/09/2026
Terror’s Changing Face, India’s Counter-Terror Strategy
Terrorism has changed profoundly since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The era of a few large, centrally controlled organisations dominating the global terror landscape has gradually given way to decentralised networks, lone-wolf attackers, online radicalisation, drone-based operations, cyber threats and technology-enabled terror financing. India’s response has also evolved—from a largely reactive and diplomatically restrained approach to a more integrated strategy centred on prevention, intelligence, deterrence, international cooperation and resilience.
The challenge before India is to sustain this transformation without allowing counter-terrorism to weaken constitutional rights, federal cooperation, social cohesion or democratic accountability.
A changing terror landscape
The terrorist threat is no longer confined to conventional armed groups operating from identifiable camps. Organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State demonstrated the power of ideology, propaganda and transnational recruitment, but their contemporary successors increasingly function through small cells, informal networks and autonomous individuals. These actors may have limited organisational links but can cause substantial harm by exploiting digital platforms, encrypted communication and easily accessible technologies.
The transformation has several dimensions.
First, terrorism has become more decentralised. Earlier, terrorist organisations relied on hierarchical command structures, identifiable leadership and dedicated training camps. Today, an individual or a small group may consume extremist propaganda online, receive remote instructions and plan an attack with minimal physical contact with a parent organisation. This reduces the possibility of detection through traditional surveillance methods.
Second, the internet has become an arena for recruitment and radicalisation. Social media, encrypted messaging applications, gaming platforms and video-sharing websites can be used to circulate extremist narratives, glorify violence and identify vulnerable individuals. Terrorist propaganda is increasingly designed for algorithmic circulation: short videos, emotionally charged messages, selective images and conspiracy theories can reach thousands of users rapidly.
Third, terrorists are exploiting emerging technologies. Drones can be used for surveillance, smuggling, delivery of weapons or explosives and attacks on sensitive installations. Artificial intelligence can assist in generating propaganda, translating extremist material and creating synthetic audio-visual content. Cyberattacks can target government databases, financial institutions, transport networks, power systems and critical infrastructure. The convergence of physical and digital threats has made terrorism a multidimensional security challenge.
India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, PRAHAAR, recognises the use of drones, social media, instant messaging applications, encrypted platforms, dark web networks and crypto wallets by terrorist organisations. It also identifies the possible misuse of robotics, cyber tools and CBRNED materials—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive and digital resources—as emerging concerns.
India’s difficult experience
India has faced terrorism for several decades, including cross-border terrorism, insurgency, separatist violence, ideological extremism and terrorism linked to organised crime. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the 1993 Mumbai serial bombings, the 1998 Coimbatore blasts, the hijacking of IC-814, the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks exposed serious vulnerabilities in India’s internal-security system.
For a long period, India’s response to cross-border terrorism was primarily diplomatic. It sought international condemnation, presented evidence of Pakistan-based groups and attempted to avoid military escalation. This approach was influenced by the risk of conflict between two nuclear-armed states. However, the absence of direct costs for repeated attacks encouraged the perception that terrorism could be employed as an instrument of state policy without provoking a decisive response.
The 26/11 Mumbai attacks became a turning point. The scale, coordination and international visibility of the assault generated wider global recognition of India’s concerns regarding cross-border terrorism. It also underlined the importance of coastal security, real-time intelligence, inter-agency coordination, urban counter-terror capabilities and international evidence-sharing.
India’s operational posture subsequently became more assertive. Following the Uri attack in 2016, India conducted cross-border surgical strikes. After the Pulwama attack in 2019, the Indian Air Force struck a terrorist training facility at Balakot. These actions signalled a shift from deterrence through restraint to deterrence through calibrated retaliation.
The broader lesson was that counter-terrorism could not be limited to defensive measures within Indian territory. It also had to target the infrastructure, financing, logistics and diplomatic protection sustaining terrorism beyond India’s borders.
From reaction to prevention
PRAHAAR, unveiled in February 2026, provides an important institutional framework for India’s counter-terrorism policy. It is based on seven broad principles: prevention of attacks, swift and proportionate response, aggregation of internal capacities, rule-of-law-based processes, reduction of conditions conducive to terrorism, international cooperation and whole-of-society resilience.
This framework is significant because it moves beyond the narrow understanding of counter-terrorism as an armed response. It treats terrorism as an ecosystem with multiple components:
The challenge before India is to sustain this transformation without allowing counter-terrorism to weaken constitutional rights, federal cooperation, social cohesion or democratic accountability.
A changing terror landscape
The terrorist threat is no longer confined to conventional armed groups operating from identifiable camps. Organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State demonstrated the power of ideology, propaganda and transnational recruitment, but their contemporary successors increasingly function through small cells, informal networks and autonomous individuals. These actors may have limited organisational links but can cause substantial harm by exploiting digital platforms, encrypted communication and easily accessible technologies.
The transformation has several dimensions.
First, terrorism has become more decentralised. Earlier, terrorist organisations relied on hierarchical command structures, identifiable leadership and dedicated training camps. Today, an individual or a small group may consume extremist propaganda online, receive remote instructions and plan an attack with minimal physical contact with a parent organisation. This reduces the possibility of detection through traditional surveillance methods.
Second, the internet has become an arena for recruitment and radicalisation. Social media, encrypted messaging applications, gaming platforms and video-sharing websites can be used to circulate extremist narratives, glorify violence and identify vulnerable individuals. Terrorist propaganda is increasingly designed for algorithmic circulation: short videos, emotionally charged messages, selective images and conspiracy theories can reach thousands of users rapidly.
Third, terrorists are exploiting emerging technologies. Drones can be used for surveillance, smuggling, delivery of weapons or explosives and attacks on sensitive installations. Artificial intelligence can assist in generating propaganda, translating extremist material and creating synthetic audio-visual content. Cyberattacks can target government databases, financial institutions, transport networks, power systems and critical infrastructure. The convergence of physical and digital threats has made terrorism a multidimensional security challenge.
India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, PRAHAAR, recognises the use of drones, social media, instant messaging applications, encrypted platforms, dark web networks and crypto wallets by terrorist organisations. It also identifies the possible misuse of robotics, cyber tools and CBRNED materials—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive and digital resources—as emerging concerns.
India’s difficult experience
India has faced terrorism for several decades, including cross-border terrorism, insurgency, separatist violence, ideological extremism and terrorism linked to organised crime. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the 1993 Mumbai serial bombings, the 1998 Coimbatore blasts, the hijacking of IC-814, the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks exposed serious vulnerabilities in India’s internal-security system.
For a long period, India’s response to cross-border terrorism was primarily diplomatic. It sought international condemnation, presented evidence of Pakistan-based groups and attempted to avoid military escalation. This approach was influenced by the risk of conflict between two nuclear-armed states. However, the absence of direct costs for repeated attacks encouraged the perception that terrorism could be employed as an instrument of state policy without provoking a decisive response.
The 26/11 Mumbai attacks became a turning point. The scale, coordination and international visibility of the assault generated wider global recognition of India’s concerns regarding cross-border terrorism. It also underlined the importance of coastal security, real-time intelligence, inter-agency coordination, urban counter-terror capabilities and international evidence-sharing.
India’s operational posture subsequently became more assertive. Following the Uri attack in 2016, India conducted cross-border surgical strikes. After the Pulwama attack in 2019, the Indian Air Force struck a terrorist training facility at Balakot. These actions signalled a shift from deterrence through restraint to deterrence through calibrated retaliation.
The broader lesson was that counter-terrorism could not be limited to defensive measures within Indian territory. It also had to target the infrastructure, financing, logistics and diplomatic protection sustaining terrorism beyond India’s borders.
From reaction to prevention
PRAHAAR, unveiled in February 2026, provides an important institutional framework for India’s counter-terrorism policy. It is based on seven broad principles: prevention of attacks, swift and proportionate response, aggregation of internal capacities, rule-of-law-based processes, reduction of conditions conducive to terrorism, international cooperation and whole-of-society resilience.
This framework is significant because it moves beyond the narrow understanding of counter-terrorism as an armed response. It treats terrorism as an ecosystem with multiple components:
- Ideological radicalisation.
- Recruitment and propaganda.
- Cross-border infiltration.
- Local logistical support.
- Weapons and explosives supply.
- Terror financing.
- Organised-crime networks.
- Safe havens and political protection.
- Digital communication and cyber infrastructure.
An effective strategy must therefore attack the entire ecosystem rather than merely eliminate individual terrorists.
At the operational level, intelligence-led prevention is central. The Multi Agency Centre and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence are intended to facilitate real-time information-sharing among central agencies and State police forces. Local police remain the first responders, while specialised forces such as the National Security Guard provide assistance during major attacks. The National Investigation Agency and State agencies are responsible for investigation and prosecution.
The effectiveness of this system depends not only on the existence of institutions but also on the quality and speed of coordination among them. Intelligence that remains confined to one agency has little preventive value. A modern counter-terror architecture must connect human intelligence, technical intelligence, financial intelligence, border surveillance, cyber monitoring and community-level information.
The federal challenge
Internal security is closely connected to the constitutional division of responsibilities between the Union and the States. Police and public order are primarily State subjects, while the Union has important responsibilities relating to national security, intelligence, border management and central armed forces. This makes cooperative federalism indispensable.
A national strategy cannot succeed if State police forces lack modern equipment, forensic capacity, specialised investigators and trained personnel. Counter-terrorism units and anti-terror squads vary considerably in their staffing, resources, training and investigative methods. PRAHAAR itself recognises the need to strengthen State and Union Territory counter-terror units and improve uniformity in their structures, resources and methodologies.
Three reforms are particularly important.
First, State police modernisation must receive sustained financial and institutional support. Police stations require secure communication systems, forensic tools, cyber-investigation capacity and trained personnel.
Second, investigative capacity must improve. Terror cases often involve digital evidence, international transactions, shell entities, encrypted communication and cross-border conspiracies. Investigators require expertise in financial tracking, data recovery, cyber forensics and international legal cooperation.
Third, inter-agency cooperation must be institutionalised rather than dependent on personal relationships. Common databases, interoperable communication systems, standard operating procedures and regular joint exercises can reduce delays and duplication.
Terror financing and organised crime
Terrorism cannot survive without money. Funds are required for recruitment, training, transport, weapons, safe houses, communication systems, propaganda and payments to support networks. Terror financing may originate through narcotics, counterfeit currency, extortion, illegal arms, hawala channels, charitable fronts, shell companies, digital assets or criminal syndicates.
The relationship between terrorism and organised crime has become increasingly important. Criminal networks provide forged documents, weapons, transportation, smuggling routes and financial channels. In return, terror organisations may provide ideological protection, territorial access or business opportunities. This convergence blurs the distinction between internal security, economic crime and national security.
India must therefore strengthen financial intelligence and asset-tracing mechanisms. Banks, payment platforms, cryptocurrency exchanges and digital intermediaries need effective systems to identify suspicious transactions while respecting privacy and due process. International cooperation is essential because funds may move through several jurisdictions before reaching a terrorist operative.
The Financial Action Task Force framework, bilateral information-sharing arrangements, mutual legal assistance treaties and extradition agreements can help India disrupt the financial infrastructure of terror groups. PRAHAAR also emphasises international legal cooperation and the disruption of terror financing networks.
The border and technology dilemma
India’s land borders, coastline and airspace present different kinds of security challenges. Infiltration across the Line of Control, arms smuggling through drones, maritime movement, trafficking routes and the movement of radicalised individuals require separate but coordinated responses.
Technology can improve border management through sensors, satellite imagery, unmanned systems, facial recognition, artificial intelligence and integrated command-and-control systems. However, technology is not a substitute for trained personnel and local intelligence. Difficult terrain, weather conditions, false alarms and data overload can reduce the effectiveness of purely technical solutions.
The drone threat illustrates this dilemma. Small commercial drones are inexpensive, easily available and difficult to detect. Counter-drone systems must therefore be combined with intelligence networks, legal controls, electronic monitoring and cooperation with local communities. Similarly, AI-based surveillance must be accompanied by safeguards against bias, wrongful identification and misuse.
The objective should be “smart security”: technology-enabled, intelligence-led and accountable.
Counter-radicalisation and social cohesion
Military and police operations can neutralise an immediate threat, but they cannot by themselves eliminate the conditions that make violent extremism attractive. Radicalisation is often shaped by a combination of ideological propaganda, social alienation, personal grievances, online manipulation, identity conflicts and perceived injustice.
India’s response must distinguish between dissent, religious belief, political disagreement and violent extremism. Overbroad labelling can alienate communities and inadvertently assist extremist propaganda. Counter-radicalisation should focus on violence, recruitment and support for terrorist organisations, not on peaceful expression or legitimate criticism.
A credible strategy should include:
At the operational level, intelligence-led prevention is central. The Multi Agency Centre and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence are intended to facilitate real-time information-sharing among central agencies and State police forces. Local police remain the first responders, while specialised forces such as the National Security Guard provide assistance during major attacks. The National Investigation Agency and State agencies are responsible for investigation and prosecution.
The effectiveness of this system depends not only on the existence of institutions but also on the quality and speed of coordination among them. Intelligence that remains confined to one agency has little preventive value. A modern counter-terror architecture must connect human intelligence, technical intelligence, financial intelligence, border surveillance, cyber monitoring and community-level information.
The federal challenge
Internal security is closely connected to the constitutional division of responsibilities between the Union and the States. Police and public order are primarily State subjects, while the Union has important responsibilities relating to national security, intelligence, border management and central armed forces. This makes cooperative federalism indispensable.
A national strategy cannot succeed if State police forces lack modern equipment, forensic capacity, specialised investigators and trained personnel. Counter-terrorism units and anti-terror squads vary considerably in their staffing, resources, training and investigative methods. PRAHAAR itself recognises the need to strengthen State and Union Territory counter-terror units and improve uniformity in their structures, resources and methodologies.
Three reforms are particularly important.
First, State police modernisation must receive sustained financial and institutional support. Police stations require secure communication systems, forensic tools, cyber-investigation capacity and trained personnel.
Second, investigative capacity must improve. Terror cases often involve digital evidence, international transactions, shell entities, encrypted communication and cross-border conspiracies. Investigators require expertise in financial tracking, data recovery, cyber forensics and international legal cooperation.
Third, inter-agency cooperation must be institutionalised rather than dependent on personal relationships. Common databases, interoperable communication systems, standard operating procedures and regular joint exercises can reduce delays and duplication.
Terror financing and organised crime
Terrorism cannot survive without money. Funds are required for recruitment, training, transport, weapons, safe houses, communication systems, propaganda and payments to support networks. Terror financing may originate through narcotics, counterfeit currency, extortion, illegal arms, hawala channels, charitable fronts, shell companies, digital assets or criminal syndicates.
The relationship between terrorism and organised crime has become increasingly important. Criminal networks provide forged documents, weapons, transportation, smuggling routes and financial channels. In return, terror organisations may provide ideological protection, territorial access or business opportunities. This convergence blurs the distinction between internal security, economic crime and national security.
India must therefore strengthen financial intelligence and asset-tracing mechanisms. Banks, payment platforms, cryptocurrency exchanges and digital intermediaries need effective systems to identify suspicious transactions while respecting privacy and due process. International cooperation is essential because funds may move through several jurisdictions before reaching a terrorist operative.
The Financial Action Task Force framework, bilateral information-sharing arrangements, mutual legal assistance treaties and extradition agreements can help India disrupt the financial infrastructure of terror groups. PRAHAAR also emphasises international legal cooperation and the disruption of terror financing networks.
The border and technology dilemma
India’s land borders, coastline and airspace present different kinds of security challenges. Infiltration across the Line of Control, arms smuggling through drones, maritime movement, trafficking routes and the movement of radicalised individuals require separate but coordinated responses.
Technology can improve border management through sensors, satellite imagery, unmanned systems, facial recognition, artificial intelligence and integrated command-and-control systems. However, technology is not a substitute for trained personnel and local intelligence. Difficult terrain, weather conditions, false alarms and data overload can reduce the effectiveness of purely technical solutions.
The drone threat illustrates this dilemma. Small commercial drones are inexpensive, easily available and difficult to detect. Counter-drone systems must therefore be combined with intelligence networks, legal controls, electronic monitoring and cooperation with local communities. Similarly, AI-based surveillance must be accompanied by safeguards against bias, wrongful identification and misuse.
The objective should be “smart security”: technology-enabled, intelligence-led and accountable.
Counter-radicalisation and social cohesion
Military and police operations can neutralise an immediate threat, but they cannot by themselves eliminate the conditions that make violent extremism attractive. Radicalisation is often shaped by a combination of ideological propaganda, social alienation, personal grievances, online manipulation, identity conflicts and perceived injustice.
India’s response must distinguish between dissent, religious belief, political disagreement and violent extremism. Overbroad labelling can alienate communities and inadvertently assist extremist propaganda. Counter-radicalisation should focus on violence, recruitment and support for terrorist organisations, not on peaceful expression or legitimate criticism.
A credible strategy should include:
- Community-based early-warning mechanisms.
- Digital literacy and media-literacy programmes.
- Psychological counselling for vulnerable youth.
- Prison de-radicalisation and rehabilitation initiatives.
- Engagement with credible religious and community leaders.
- Support for families seeking help.
- Opportunities for education, employment and social integration.
- Rehabilitation pathways for individuals assessed as low-risk.
PRAHAAR adopts a multi-stakeholder approach involving community leaders, moderate preachers, civil society organisations and public institutions. It also links counter-radicalisation with education, employment and social empowerment.
This is important because social trust is itself a security asset. Communities that trust public institutions are more likely to share information, resist extremist recruitment and support victims after an attack.
Rule of law and human rights
A strong counter-terror policy must be both effective and constitutional. Exceptional security threats cannot justify unlimited executive power. Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention, custodial abuse, collective punishment, inadequate legal representation and selective prosecution can damage the legitimacy of the State and create new grievances.
PRAHAAR explicitly places counter-terrorism within the framework of human rights and the rule of law. India’s anti-terror legal architecture includes the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, the Explosives Substances Act, the Arms Act and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.
The existence of legal safeguards, however, is not sufficient. Their implementation must be transparent and subject to judicial review. Investigative agencies should maintain strong evidentiary standards, particularly when relying on digital material, anonymous witnesses or intelligence inputs. Prosecution must be based on credible evidence rather than public pressure.
Rule-of-law-based counter-terrorism is not a sign of weakness. It improves the quality of investigations, strengthens convictions, prevents wrongful targeting and protects the legitimacy necessary for long-term security.
International diplomacy
Terrorism is transnational in recruitment, financing, ideology and logistics. No country can address it alone. India must continue to pursue intelligence-sharing arrangements, extradition, mutual legal assistance, joint investigations and international designation of terrorists and their supporters.
At the diplomatic level, India has consistently advocated a comprehensive international convention on terrorism. Its concerns include the absence of a universally accepted definition, selective designation of terrorist groups, the use of double standards and the shielding of terrorists for geopolitical reasons.
India’s counter-terror diplomacy should rest on four principles:
This is important because social trust is itself a security asset. Communities that trust public institutions are more likely to share information, resist extremist recruitment and support victims after an attack.
Rule of law and human rights
A strong counter-terror policy must be both effective and constitutional. Exceptional security threats cannot justify unlimited executive power. Arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention, custodial abuse, collective punishment, inadequate legal representation and selective prosecution can damage the legitimacy of the State and create new grievances.
PRAHAAR explicitly places counter-terrorism within the framework of human rights and the rule of law. India’s anti-terror legal architecture includes the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, the Explosives Substances Act, the Arms Act and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.
The existence of legal safeguards, however, is not sufficient. Their implementation must be transparent and subject to judicial review. Investigative agencies should maintain strong evidentiary standards, particularly when relying on digital material, anonymous witnesses or intelligence inputs. Prosecution must be based on credible evidence rather than public pressure.
Rule-of-law-based counter-terrorism is not a sign of weakness. It improves the quality of investigations, strengthens convictions, prevents wrongful targeting and protects the legitimacy necessary for long-term security.
International diplomacy
Terrorism is transnational in recruitment, financing, ideology and logistics. No country can address it alone. India must continue to pursue intelligence-sharing arrangements, extradition, mutual legal assistance, joint investigations and international designation of terrorists and their supporters.
At the diplomatic level, India has consistently advocated a comprehensive international convention on terrorism. Its concerns include the absence of a universally accepted definition, selective designation of terrorist groups, the use of double standards and the shielding of terrorists for geopolitical reasons.
India’s counter-terror diplomacy should rest on four principles:
- No distinction between “good” and “bad” terrorism.
- No justification of terrorism on political, religious or strategic grounds.
- No safe haven, financing or logistical support for terrorists.
- Accountability for both terrorist organisations and those who materially assist them.
However, diplomacy must also be carefully calibrated. Military retaliation may strengthen deterrence, but it carries the risk of escalation, civilian casualties and wider conflict. A credible strategy must combine military preparedness with back-channel communication, crisis-management mechanisms and international support.
The way forward
India’s counter-terrorism strategy should now focus on seven priorities.
The way forward
India’s counter-terrorism strategy should now focus on seven priorities.
- Build an integrated intelligence system. Intelligence agencies, State police, financial investigators, border forces and cyber institutions must share actionable information in real time.
- Strengthen State capacity. National security ultimately depends on the quality of policing, investigation and community engagement at the local level.
- Develop counter-drone and cyber capabilities. Critical infrastructure, defence networks, public databases and communication systems require continuous protection and periodic security audits.
- Target the full terror ecosystem. Operations must address financiers, recruiters, handlers, arms suppliers, propaganda distributors, facilitators and criminal networks.
- Modernise prosecution and forensics. Terror cases require specialised prosecutors, digital-forensics laboratories, witness protection and international evidence-gathering mechanisms.
- Invest in prevention and social resilience. Education, employment, mental-health support, community dialogue and digital literacy can reduce vulnerability to extremist recruitment.
- Preserve constitutional legitimacy. Every counter-terror action must remain compatible with equality, due process, judicial oversight and fundamental rights.
Conclusion
The changing face of terrorism demands a changing response. India can no longer rely only on border fencing, conventional intelligence or post-attack retaliation. The threat now operates simultaneously in physical, digital, financial, ideological and criminal spaces.
India’s movement from a reactive posture to an intelligence-led, preventive and deterrence-oriented strategy is an important institutional development. PRAHAAR provides a framework that combines prevention, response, inter-agency coordination, international cooperation, human rights and societal resilience.
Yet policy documents must be converted into operational capability. India’s long-term success will depend on cooperative federalism, professional policing, technological readiness, financial disruption, community trust and constitutional restraint. The ultimate aim should not merely be to defeat terrorists after they emerge, but to make recruitment difficult, financing impossible, infiltration risky, propaganda ineffective and public institutions resilient.
A secure India will therefore require not only stronger weapons and better intelligence, but also stronger democratic institutions and a society confident enough to reject both terrorism and the fear-driven divisions it seeks to create.
