Editorial-12/09/2026
More heft: On India and the 18th BRICS Summit
Hosting the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, marks a defining moment for India’s diplomacy: it is both a test of consensus-building in an expanded, fractious grouping and an opportunity to re-centre BRICS on development, reform and strategic autonomy. Under India’s 2026 chairship theme—“Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” anchored in a “Humanity First” vision—New Delhi is seeking to convert BRICS from a loose coalition of convenience into a coherent platform for Global South agency without letting it slide into an anti-Western bloc dominated by China and Russia.
Context: Why this summit matters now
India’s fourth BRICS chairship (after 2012, 2016 and 2021) comes at the grouping’s 20-year milestone and against a turbulent geopolitical backdrop: an expanded membership of 11 full members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia), active conflicts involving members or partners, and growing U.S.–China strategic competition. The summit at Bharat Mandapam—where India hosted the G20 in 2023—signals continuity in India’s preference for large, inclusive multilateral forums that amplify the Global South’s voice while preserving New Delhi’s strategic autonomy.
Being part of BRICS gives India “more heft” at the global high table: the bloc represents roughly half the world’s population, about two-fifths of global GDP (PPP) and a quarter of world trade, and includes major energy producers and consumers. For India, BRICS is not an alternative alliance system but a lever to push for reformed multilateralism, secure development finance, diversify trade and technology partnerships, and maintain room to manoeuvre between Washington and Beijing.
The diplomatic paradox: “non-West” vs “anti-West”
India faces a core paradox: it wants BRICS to be a stronger voice for the Global South without letting it become an anti-U.S./anti-Western bloc. This is difficult because several factors push the grouping towards confrontation: China’s desire to use BRICS as a counterpoise to Western dominance; Russia’s war in Ukraine and its reliance on non-Western partners; Iran’s conflict with the U.S. and Israel; and recent U.S. tariff threats against BRICS members over de-dollarisation and trade practices.
India’s answer has been to insist on a “non-West” identity—engaging multiple poles without aligning against any—while keeping the agenda development-first. The 2026 theme’s four pillars (Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, Sustainability) are deliberately practical and people-centric, designed to pull BRICS away from geopolitical grandstanding and back to concrete cooperation in trade, technology, energy, finance and climate.
Expansion and cohesion: The risk of drift
BRICS has strayed from its original purpose: to give emerging economies a greater voice in global governance and push for equitable reform of financial and economic institutions. India was an enthusiastic early participant, helping establish the New Development Bank (NDB) and integrating counter-terrorism cooperation into BRICS work. But as China pushed expansion—of both the NDB and membership—India and Brazil resisted, fearing loss of focus and consensus.
Expansion happened anyway: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Indonesia joined, along with partner-country mechanisms. The result is a more representative but more unwieldy bloc, where bilateral conflicts among new members (for instance, Iran–UAE tensions) complicate consensus on joint declarations. India’s challenge is to prevent BRICS from following SAARC’s path, where bilateral disputes paralysed the group, while preserving the principle of consensus that kept the original five cohesive.
India’s agenda: Reformed multilateralism and practical cooperation
At the 2018 BRICS Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated “reformed multilateralism,” which by 2019 found its way into BRICS documents through India–Brazil–South Africa advocacy. In 2026, India is reviving this agenda: using BRICS to demand structural reforms of Western-dominated global governance institutions while avoiding the creation of a parallel, China-led Bretton Woods system.
Practically, India’s blueprint focuses on:
Context: Why this summit matters now
India’s fourth BRICS chairship (after 2012, 2016 and 2021) comes at the grouping’s 20-year milestone and against a turbulent geopolitical backdrop: an expanded membership of 11 full members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia), active conflicts involving members or partners, and growing U.S.–China strategic competition. The summit at Bharat Mandapam—where India hosted the G20 in 2023—signals continuity in India’s preference for large, inclusive multilateral forums that amplify the Global South’s voice while preserving New Delhi’s strategic autonomy.
Being part of BRICS gives India “more heft” at the global high table: the bloc represents roughly half the world’s population, about two-fifths of global GDP (PPP) and a quarter of world trade, and includes major energy producers and consumers. For India, BRICS is not an alternative alliance system but a lever to push for reformed multilateralism, secure development finance, diversify trade and technology partnerships, and maintain room to manoeuvre between Washington and Beijing.
The diplomatic paradox: “non-West” vs “anti-West”
India faces a core paradox: it wants BRICS to be a stronger voice for the Global South without letting it become an anti-U.S./anti-Western bloc. This is difficult because several factors push the grouping towards confrontation: China’s desire to use BRICS as a counterpoise to Western dominance; Russia’s war in Ukraine and its reliance on non-Western partners; Iran’s conflict with the U.S. and Israel; and recent U.S. tariff threats against BRICS members over de-dollarisation and trade practices.
India’s answer has been to insist on a “non-West” identity—engaging multiple poles without aligning against any—while keeping the agenda development-first. The 2026 theme’s four pillars (Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, Sustainability) are deliberately practical and people-centric, designed to pull BRICS away from geopolitical grandstanding and back to concrete cooperation in trade, technology, energy, finance and climate.
Expansion and cohesion: The risk of drift
BRICS has strayed from its original purpose: to give emerging economies a greater voice in global governance and push for equitable reform of financial and economic institutions. India was an enthusiastic early participant, helping establish the New Development Bank (NDB) and integrating counter-terrorism cooperation into BRICS work. But as China pushed expansion—of both the NDB and membership—India and Brazil resisted, fearing loss of focus and consensus.
Expansion happened anyway: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Indonesia joined, along with partner-country mechanisms. The result is a more representative but more unwieldy bloc, where bilateral conflicts among new members (for instance, Iran–UAE tensions) complicate consensus on joint declarations. India’s challenge is to prevent BRICS from following SAARC’s path, where bilateral disputes paralysed the group, while preserving the principle of consensus that kept the original five cohesive.
India’s agenda: Reformed multilateralism and practical cooperation
At the 2018 BRICS Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated “reformed multilateralism,” which by 2019 found its way into BRICS documents through India–Brazil–South Africa advocacy. In 2026, India is reviving this agenda: using BRICS to demand structural reforms of Western-dominated global governance institutions while avoiding the creation of a parallel, China-led Bretton Woods system.
Practically, India’s blueprint focuses on:
- Trade and payments: Boosting intra-BRICS trade and exploring interlinked payment systems, central bank digital currencies and national-currency transactions—without endorsing a renminbi-dominated BRICS currency.
- Technology and AI: Cooperating on emerging technologies while resisting standards that entrench state control or digital fragmentation; ensuring BRICS does not become a vehicle for rival tech blocs.
- Energy and sustainability: Leveraging BRICS’ energy producers and consumers to stabilise supplies, advance clean energy transitions and climate resilience.
- Development finance: Strengthening the NDB’s role for infrastructure and sustainable projects in the Global South, without letting it become a tool for geopolitical leverage.
This agenda serves India’s larger interest of multi-alignment: engaging the West where beneficial, deepening ties with the Global South, and containing China’s dominance without confrontation.
India–China and India–Russia: Managing contradictions
The summit is also a test of India’s ability to manage contradictory objectives with China and Russia. With China, India seeks to prevent another border crisis while expanding economic engagement where it serves Indian interests; mutual distrust remains substantial despite a gradual thaw after the 2024 patrolling agreement. For Beijing, BRICS is a vehicle to amplify Global South influence and challenge Western dominance; for India, it is a platform to maintain strategic autonomy without joining a China-led bloc.
With Russia, India continues to push for a negotiated settlement to end the Ukraine war, reiterating its peace message to President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. India’s stance is consistent: it values its defence and energy ties with Moscow but refuses to endorse aggression or abandon its commitment to international law.
The U.S. factor: Tariffs, de-dollarisation and strategic autonomy
The U.S. factor looms large. Former President Donald Trump has accused India of trying to undermine the dollar’s dominance and threatened tariffs on BRICS members over plans to boost intra-BRICS trade and payments. This creates a delicate balancing act: India must avoid provoking U.S. displeasure while pursuing its own economic and strategic interests within BRICS.
India’s approach is to emphasise practical cooperation—interlinked payment systems, national-currency trade—rather than ideological de-dollarisation, thereby reducing friction with Washington while diversifying risk. At the same time, India is careful not to let BRICS become an anti-U.S. platform, recognising that erratic U.S. policies (tariffs, Quad hesitancy, Pakistan outreach) increase the temptation for BRICS to drift in that direction.
What success looks like for India
Success at the 18th Summit would mean:
India–China and India–Russia: Managing contradictions
The summit is also a test of India’s ability to manage contradictory objectives with China and Russia. With China, India seeks to prevent another border crisis while expanding economic engagement where it serves Indian interests; mutual distrust remains substantial despite a gradual thaw after the 2024 patrolling agreement. For Beijing, BRICS is a vehicle to amplify Global South influence and challenge Western dominance; for India, it is a platform to maintain strategic autonomy without joining a China-led bloc.
With Russia, India continues to push for a negotiated settlement to end the Ukraine war, reiterating its peace message to President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. India’s stance is consistent: it values its defence and energy ties with Moscow but refuses to endorse aggression or abandon its commitment to international law.
The U.S. factor: Tariffs, de-dollarisation and strategic autonomy
The U.S. factor looms large. Former President Donald Trump has accused India of trying to undermine the dollar’s dominance and threatened tariffs on BRICS members over plans to boost intra-BRICS trade and payments. This creates a delicate balancing act: India must avoid provoking U.S. displeasure while pursuing its own economic and strategic interests within BRICS.
India’s approach is to emphasise practical cooperation—interlinked payment systems, national-currency trade—rather than ideological de-dollarisation, thereby reducing friction with Washington while diversifying risk. At the same time, India is careful not to let BRICS become an anti-U.S. platform, recognising that erratic U.S. policies (tariffs, Quad hesitancy, Pakistan outreach) increase the temptation for BRICS to drift in that direction.
What success looks like for India
Success at the 18th Summit would mean:
- A unified declaration that reflects the “Humanity First” theme and avoids anti-Western rhetoric.
- Concrete outcomes on trade, technology, energy and development finance that benefit the Global South without entrenching Chinese dominance.
- Progress on India–China stabilisation and India–Russia peace diplomacy, without compromising India’s core interests.
- Reinforcement of BRICS as a “non-West” middle-power coalition that pushes for reformed multilateralism rather than parallel institutions.
Given the grouping’s heterogeneity and the global conflicts involving members, achieving even a modest consensus would be a diplomatic victory for India.
Way forward: Course-correcting BRICS
The 2026 Summit offers India a chance to course-correct BRICS: revive its original raison d’être (reform and stability), shape the expanded grouping into a vehicle for Global South agency, and stop others from hijacking it for geopolitical confrontation. India must continue to persuade new members to overcome political differences, insist on consensus, and keep the agenda practical and development-oriented.
If India succeeds, BRICS can become a credible organisation of Global South middle powers—imperfect in composition but potent in geo-economic and geopolitical influence. If it fails, BRICS risks fragmentation or transformation into a China–Russia-led anti-Western bloc, undermining India’s strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.
In short, the 18th BRICS Summit is less about a single grand outcome and more about what it reveals: a multipolar grouping held together by India’s careful diplomatic stitching. For India, the heft comes not from declarations alone but from the ability to shape BRICS into a platform that advances its ambitions on the global high table—without sacrificing its principles or partnerships.
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Way forward: Course-correcting BRICS
The 2026 Summit offers India a chance to course-correct BRICS: revive its original raison d’être (reform and stability), shape the expanded grouping into a vehicle for Global South agency, and stop others from hijacking it for geopolitical confrontation. India must continue to persuade new members to overcome political differences, insist on consensus, and keep the agenda practical and development-oriented.
If India succeeds, BRICS can become a credible organisation of Global South middle powers—imperfect in composition but potent in geo-economic and geopolitical influence. If it fails, BRICS risks fragmentation or transformation into a China–Russia-led anti-Western bloc, undermining India’s strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.
In short, the 18th BRICS Summit is less about a single grand outcome and more about what it reveals: a multipolar grouping held together by India’s careful diplomatic stitching. For India, the heft comes not from declarations alone but from the ability to shape BRICS into a platform that advances its ambitions on the global high table—without sacrificing its principles or partnerships.
