Editorial-28/09/2026
In need of an overhaul: on the Election Commission of India’s press note
The Election Commission of India’s (ECI) recent press note, issued after months of internal dissent and public controversy over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, reads less like a course correction and more like calibrated damage control. While it concedes some procedural lapses and promises administrative tweaks, it sidesteps the core questions that have shaken public confidence in the poll body’s impartiality and institutional integrity. What is required is not cosmetic reform but a structural overhaul that restores the ECI’s constitutional character as a multi-member, transparent, and accountable referee of Indian democracy.
Context: The SIR controversy and internal dissent
The immediate trigger for the current crisis was a series of reports revealing that two of the three Election Commissioners—Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi—had filed 14 written objections over a 10-month period against decisions taken under Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar. These objections spanned critical issues: unlawful changes to Form 6 (the voter enrolment form), mass deletion of names from electoral rolls during the SIR, restricted access to the ECINET portal for field officers, and the filing of appeals against voters whose inclusion had been ordered by judicial authorities in West Bengal.
In response, the ECI’s September 26 press note claimed that all major decisions, including the nationwide SIR order of June 2025, were taken with “unanimous approval” of the Commission. It announced a set of nine administrative measures: Booth Level Officers (BLOs) would now visit voters’ homes instead of summoning them for hearings; agendas would be circulated before meetings and minutes issued afterward; a committee would review the ECINET system; and international travel by ECI officials would require prior approval. A “unity photograph” of the CEC and the two ECs was appended to project consensus.
Yet, as multiple editorials and analyses have pointed out, the note raises more questions than it answers. It does not disclose who authorised the controversial changes to Form 6, who filed the 1.61 million appeals in West Bengal against judicially restored voters, or why software to reinstate deleted names in Goa was never enabled despite requests. It remains silent on accountability for senior officials whose conduct was flagged by the dissenting Commissioners. Most critically, it offers no remedy for the estimated 130 million names deleted from draft rolls nationwide or the 90% of West Bengal appeals that later reinstated voters—often after elections had already been held.
Why the press note falls short?
Procedural fixes without substantive accountability
The ECI’s concessions are largely procedural: better meeting protocols, a review committee for ECINET, and relief from in-person hearings for certain categories of voters. These are welcome but insufficient. They address symptoms, not causes. The core allegations—that statutory forms were altered without legal authority, that electoral rolls were purged en masse without individualised reasoning, and that field officers were stripped of access to the very system they were mandated to operate—remain unaddressed.
For instance, the press note acknowledges that the declaration attached to Form 6 for SIR was upheld by the Supreme Court but does not explain who inserted the additional question on parents’ details in July 2025, despite Commissioner Sandhu terming it “unauthorised/illegal” in August. Similarly, while it promises a “special drive” to re-enrol voters omitted during SIR, it treats them as fresh applicants rather than acknowledging that many were legitimate voters wrongly deleted. This shifts the burden of proof onto the citizen, contravening the principle that the state must justify deletions, not the voter justify inclusion.
The SIR’s structural flaws
The SIR itself, launched in June 2025 beginning with Bihar and West Bengal, has been criticised for inverting the logic of electoral enfranchisement. Instead of treating inclusion as the default and deletion as an exception requiring due process, the SIR presumed ineligibility and required voters to re-prove their entitlement. The Supreme Court’s May 27, 2026 judgment, while upholding the SIR in principle, failed to grapple with its implementation: by the time the Court ruled, the exercise had already disenfranchised millions in Phase 2 states.
Evidence of the SIR’s flawed execution is mounting. In West Bengal, over 90% of appeals filed by deleted voters have resulted in reinstatement—yet many of these restorations came after the 2026 Assembly elections. In Delhi, one-third of constituencies show fewer voters in the 2026 draft rolls than actually voted in 2025. These are not anomalies; they are systemic outcomes of a process that prioritised administrative convenience over constitutional safeguards.
Institutional opacity and unilateralism
Perhaps the most damaging revelation has been the erosion of the ECI’s multi-member character. The dissenting Commissioners’ notes suggest that key decisions were taken without full deliberation, that meeting agendas were not shared in advance, and that minutes were not recorded. The press note’s promise to circulate agendas and issue minutes is an admission that these norms were violated—but it stops short of explaining why or how.
This opacity is compounded by the concentration of technical control over ECINET in the hands of a few IT officials, notably DG(IT) Seema Khanna and senior deputy Election Commissioner Maneesh Garg, whose actions were questioned by Commissioners Sandhu and Joshi. The press note’s silence on disciplinary or corrective action against these officials reinforces perceptions of a “one-man show” under the CEC.
The deeper crisis: ECI’s appointment structure
The root of the ECI’s vulnerability lies in its appointment mechanism. Since the 2023 Supreme Court judgment in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, the selection of the CEC and ECs has been vested in a committee comprising the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition, and a Union Minister. In practice, this gives the executive a 2:1 majority, undermining the Court’s intent to insulate the ECI from political influence.
The Hindu editorial argues persuasively that anything less than a restructured selection committee—one that does not grant the government an overriding majority—will fail to restore institutional trust. The current arrangement allows the executive to shape the ECI’s composition in ways that may compromise its independence, especially in politically sensitive moments like the SIR rollout ahead of key state elections.
This structural flaw is not new. During the Emergency (1975–77), a compliant judiciary and legislature enabled executive overreach, with institutions like the ECI unable to act as effective checks. Today, under CEC Kumar, the ECI risks repeating that pattern—not through overt coercion, but through administrative centralisation, procedural opacity, and a deferential approach to executive preferences.
What an overhaul must entail?
Restoring the ECI’s credibility requires more than press notes and photo ops. It demands a multi-pronged overhaul:
- Structural reform of appointments: The selection committee must be rebalanced to ensure the executive does not hold a decisive majority. Options include adding the Chief Justice of India or an independent member nominated by a bipartisan parliamentary panel.
- Statutory safeguards for multi-member functioning: The Election Commission Act should mandate that all policy decisions—especially those affecting voter enfranchisement—require recorded votes and published minutes. Unilateral directives by the CEC should be expressly prohibited.
- Transparency in IT governance: ECINET must be governed by a steering committee with representation from all Commissioners, independent technologists, and civil society. Access rights for EROs and BLOs should be codified in law, not left to administrative discretion.
- Remedial action for SIR victims: Voters deleted during SIR must be automatically reinstated pending verification, not forced to reapply as fresh enrollees. A time-bound, judicially monitored audit of SIR deletions and restorations should be conducted in all affected states.
- Accountability for procedural violations: An independent inquiry should examine who authorised changes to Form 6, who filed appeals against judicially restored voters, and why software modules for reinstatement were disabled. Officials found responsible should face disciplinary action.
The stakes for Indian democracy
The ECI is not just another bureaucracy; it is the guardian of the democratic compact. Its credibility underwrites the belief that elections are free, fair, and reflective of the people’s will. When that credibility is eroded—by mass deletions, opaque decision-making, or perceived executive capture—the entire edifice of representative democracy is weakened.
In an era of rising political polarisation and institutional stress, the ECI’s role as an impartial referee is more critical than ever. The September 26 press note, while a step toward breaking silence, does not go far enough to rebuild trust. It treats dissent as an administrative glitch rather than a constitutional warning sign. It offers procedural bandaids while the patient bleeds from structural wounds.
The path forward is clear: the ECI must be restructured, not just reformed. Its appointment process must be depoliticised, its internal functioning democratised, and its technological infrastructure made transparent and accountable. Anything less would undermine the essence of institutional democracy—and betray the trust of “We, the People” in the integrity of elections.
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