Editorial -14/09/2026
Building Consensus: On the 18th BRICS Summit and the New Delhi Declaration
The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi will be remembered not merely for the adoption of another joint declaration, but for the diplomatic effort required to produce one. In an international environment marked by war, protectionism, sanctions, distrust and a weakening of multilateral institutions, the ability of an expanded and politically diverse BRICS to arrive at a consensus was itself a significant achievement. The New Delhi Declaration seeks to present BRICS as a voice of the Global South, demanding a more representative global order while advancing practical cooperation in trade, finance, technology, counter-terrorism, development and sustainability.
The summit was held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, under the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” The declaration reaffirmed the grouping’s commitment to sovereign equality, solidarity, inclusiveness, dialogue and consensus, while emphasising cooperation across its three established pillars—political and security cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
Yet the importance of the summit lies as much in what the declaration says as in what it carefully avoids saying. BRICS remains a coalition of countries with different political systems, strategic alignments, economic interests and interpretations of international law. It includes India and China, whose bilateral relationship remains marked by unresolved tensions; Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which have been positioned differently on West Asian conflicts; Russia, which remains deeply opposed to Western strategic and economic policies; and several countries that maintain close relations with the United States and Europe.
The New Delhi Declaration therefore represents a carefully negotiated balance. It articulates opposition to unilateralism without becoming a formal anti-Western manifesto, condemns terrorism without turning the document into an indictment of any particular state, and addresses West Asian conflicts without assigning responsibility in language that would have made consensus impossible. The diplomatic achievement is real, but so are the limitations.
Consensus in a Fragmented World
BRICS was established in 2009 as a platform for cooperation among major emerging economies. Its original members—Brazil, Russia, India and China—were joined by South Africa in 2010. The group has since expanded to include countries from West Asia, Africa and Asia, making it more representative of the developing world but also more difficult to manage politically.
Expansion has increased BRICS’s geographical and economic significance. It has also deepened internal diversity. The group is no longer a compact association of four major emerging economies with broadly comparable objectives. It now represents a much wider range of development models, regional interests and foreign-policy orientations. As a result, consensus cannot be assumed merely because members share dissatisfaction with the existing international order.
The failure of BRICS foreign ministers to issue a joint statement in May 2026 had underlined these difficulties. Differences between Iran and the UAE, particularly over the language relating to West Asian tensions, threatened to expose the limits of the organisation’s consensus-based model. The eventual agreement in New Delhi followed intensive negotiations, with diplomats reportedly working until the early hours of the summit day
In this context, the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration is important for three reasons.
First, it prevented the perception that an expanded BRICS was incapable of collective political communication. A failure to adopt a declaration would have strengthened the argument that the group is too heterogeneous to become an effective force in world affairs.
Second, it preserved the principle that BRICS decisions are based on consultation rather than coercion. Consensus allows smaller and less powerful members to retain a voice, even when the group includes major powers with much greater economic and military capabilities.
Third, it demonstrated India’s ability to act as a bridge-builder. New Delhi’s diplomatic challenge was to retain the strategic autonomy of BRICS while preventing the grouping from being reduced to an instrument of confrontation with the West.
The declaration’s language on reforming global governance reflects this balancing act. It calls for a more democratic, representative, legitimate and accountable international system and stresses the need to increase the participation of emerging and developing countries in global decision-making. It also calls for reform of the United Nations Security Council and supports the aspirations of Brazil and India for a greater role in the UN, including the Security Council. China and Russia reiterated their support for the aspirations of Brazil and India.
For India, this is diplomatically valuable. Support from China and Russia for India’s claim to a larger role in global governance strengthens New Delhi’s argument that its demand is not merely a Western-backed proposal but part of a broader Global South aspiration. At the same time, the declaration invokes the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration, thereby recognising Africa’s demand for permanent representation in the Security Council.
However, the declaration does not resolve the central political problem: Security Council reform requires the consent of existing permanent members and a complex amendment process. BRICS can create diplomatic pressure, but it cannot by itself deliver institutional reform. The real test will be whether member countries can coordinate their positions in UN negotiations rather than merely repeat general principles at summits.
Multilateralism and Strategic Autonomy
The New Delhi Declaration emerges at a time when global institutions face a crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness. The United Nations has struggled to prevent wars or enforce international law consistently. The World Trade Organization’s dispute-settlement system remains weakened. The Bretton Woods institutions continue to reflect power structures created in a very different economic era.
The declaration therefore criticises the under-representation of emerging and developing economies in global institutions. It calls for reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so that voting shares, leadership positions and decision-making structures better reflect contemporary economic realities. It also demands greater regional diversity and more meaningful participation of developing countries in senior positions within international organisations.
This is a long-standing BRICS position, but its urgency has increased. Developing countries have faced the effects of debt distress, high interest rates, food and energy insecurity, climate-related disasters and disruptions to global supply chains. Yet their influence over the institutions that shape the global financial system remains limited.
The declaration’s support for a stronger and more representative multilateral system is therefore justified. But BRICS must also confront an internal contradiction. Its members themselves differ sharply on questions of sovereignty, human rights, intervention, territorial disputes and the interpretation of international law. A coalition that opposes the unequal application of global rules must demonstrate that its own conduct is guided by consistent principles.
This does not mean that BRICS must become a political alliance with a single ideology. Its strength has always been its diversity. But the group needs a minimum normative framework based on respect for sovereignty, opposition to aggression, peaceful dispute resolution, protection of civilians and adherence to international humanitarian law. Without such consistency, its call for a fairer global order may be dismissed as an attempt to replace one form of power politics with another.
India’s approach of strategic autonomy is particularly relevant here. New Delhi has sought to maintain constructive relations with the United States and Europe while also participating actively in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other non-Western platforms. This is not a contradiction. India’s objective is to preserve decision-making space in a multipolar world.
The New Delhi Summit allowed India to present itself as a country capable of engaging across geopolitical divisions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s interactions with the leaders of Iran, China, ASEAN and African countries reflected this effort to combine strategic autonomy with diplomatic outreach. The summit also created space for a bilateral meeting between Iran and the UAE, reportedly their first such interaction since the intensification of hostilities.
India’s credibility as a bridge-builder, however, will depend on sustained diplomacy beyond the summit. Consensus achieved through carefully drafted language is only the beginning. Mediation requires follow-up mechanisms, confidence-building measures and a willingness to engage with difficult disagreements.
Trade, Finance and Local Currencies
The economic dimension of the declaration is perhaps more consequential than its political language. BRICS countries are increasingly concerned about the use of tariffs, sanctions and financial restrictions as instruments of geopolitical pressure. The declaration condemns unilateral coercive measures that are contrary to international law and criticises tariffs and non-tariff barriers that undermine the predictability of global trade.
It also opposes protectionism presented in the language of environmental policy, particularly when climate-related trade measures become discriminatory or punitive. This is a significant concern for developing countries, which fear that carbon border measures and technical standards may function as disguised barriers to their exports.
The declaration’s response is not to propose isolation from the global economy. Instead, it supports reform of the WTO and the restoration of a functioning, two-tier dispute-settlement mechanism. This is a constructive position. A rules-based trading system is particularly important for developing countries because it limits the ability of powerful economies to impose arbitrary restrictions.
At the same time, BRICS is seeking to reduce its vulnerability to Western financial systems. The declaration encourages greater use of local currencies for trade and investment and supports the development of faster, cheaper, safer and more accessible cross-border payment arrangements. It also encourages the New Development Bank to expand local-currency financing and diversify its sources of funds.
The declaration does not announce a common BRICS currency. This is a sensible decision. A shared currency would require deep financial integration, coordinated monetary policies, open capital accounts, substantial mutual trust and a stable institutional framework. These conditions do not currently exist among BRICS members.
A more realistic approach is to develop interoperable payment systems, promote direct currency settlement where feasible, establish stronger financial messaging arrangements and expand local-currency lending. Such incremental steps could reduce transaction costs and the impact of sanctions without seeking to replace the dollar overnight.
However, de-dollarisation is easier to announce than to implement. The dollar’s continued centrality is supported by the depth and liquidity of US financial markets, the convertibility of the currency, the global role of American institutions and the reliability of payment and settlement systems. BRICS members also have significant differences in exchange-rate regimes, capital controls and macroeconomic stability.
Local-currency trade will therefore grow gradually and selectively. It will be most practical in sectors where bilateral trade is substantial and relatively balanced. Where trade is highly unequal, one country may accumulate large quantities of another member’s currency without having sufficient opportunities to use it. The creation of credible clearing arrangements and deep local-currency financial markets will be essential.
The New Development Bank can play a useful role. Its ability to finance infrastructure and sustainable-development projects in local currencies can help reduce currency risks for borrowers. But the bank must maintain high standards of governance, transparency and financial discipline if it is to become a credible alternative source of development finance.
Security, Terrorism and West Asia
The declaration’s security language reflects both India’s priorities and the wider instability of the international environment. It calls for dialogue, preventive diplomacy and peaceful settlement of disputes. It expresses concern about rising military expenditure, nuclear risks and attacks on civilian infrastructure and safeguarded nuclear facilities.
The statement also condemns terrorism in all its forms and specifically denounces the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025, in which 26 people were killed. It identifies cross-border movement of terrorists, terrorist financing and safe havens as major concerns, and calls for zero tolerance and an end to double standards in counter-terrorism.
This is an important diplomatic gain for India. New Delhi has consistently argued that the international community must recognise the specific threat posed by cross-border terrorism and hold not only perpetrators but also their sponsors and facilitators accountable. The inclusion of the Pahalgam attack in a consensus BRICS document gives greater international visibility to India’s position.
Yet implementation remains the central challenge. BRICS includes countries with different assessments of armed groups, resistance movements and national-liberation struggles. The declaration’s rejection of double standards is meaningful only if members apply the principle uniformly. Counter-terrorism cooperation must also respect international human rights law and avoid becoming a justification for indiscriminate measures against civilian populations.
West Asia was the most sensitive issue at the summit. The declaration expresses concern over the escalation of tensions, urges maximum restraint and calls for dialogue and diplomacy. It also stresses the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, the preservation of energy flows and the smooth movement of trade and shipping.
On Gaza and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the declaration adopts strong language. It calls for a ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access and an end to forced displacement. It condemns attacks on civilians, healthcare facilities and other civilian infrastructure, as well as the use of starvation as a method of warfare. It supports the two-state solution, with a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.
This position reflects the broad consensus among BRICS members and much of the Global South. It also demonstrates that BRICS is not merely an economic grouping concerned with tariffs and payment systems. It seeks to influence debates on war, humanitarian law and global peace.
Nevertheless, the document’s careful avoidance of naming individual actors reveals the limits of consensus diplomacy. While this may have been necessary to secure agreement among members with competing regional relationships, it reduces the clarity of political accountability. A declaration that condemns general principles but avoids identifying violations may preserve unity while weakening its deterrent effect.
The correct response is not to abandon consensus but to supplement it with practical diplomacy. BRICS could support humanitarian coordination, mediation efforts, reconstruction financing, protection of maritime routes and independent monitoring of ceasefires. Its role will be judged less by the strength of its language than by the concrete assistance it provides to conflict-affected societies.
Technology, Development and Sustainability
The New Delhi Declaration also reflects the changing agenda of international cooperation. Artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, space technology, health security and sustainable development occupy a prominent place alongside traditional questions of war and trade.
On artificial intelligence, BRICS seeks wider access to AI resources while stressing safety, security, inclusiveness, reliability, energy efficiency and trustworthy governance. The declaration places particular emphasis on the needs of the Global South and welcomes India’s hosting of the AI Impact Summit in February 2026.
This is an important area for India. AI governance is currently being shaped by a small number of technologically advanced countries and large corporations. Developing countries risk becoming consumers of systems designed elsewhere, without adequate influence over standards, data governance, intellectual-property rules or the distribution of economic benefits.
BRICS can contribute by promoting open research, affordable computing access, responsible data-sharing, multilingual AI systems and capacity-building. However, cooperation must not remain rhetorical. Member countries should develop common principles on safety testing, algorithmic accountability, privacy, cybersecurity and access to critical infrastructure.
The proposal for a BRICS repository on digital public infrastructure is another notable initiative. India’s experience with digital identity, payments and public-service delivery has attracted interest across the developing world. Sharing interoperable and adaptable digital solutions can help member countries improve financial inclusion, health services, education and welfare delivery.
But digital public infrastructure also raises risks relating to surveillance, exclusion, data protection and cybersecurity. The export of platforms must therefore be accompanied by strong safeguards, independent oversight and respect for national circumstances.
The declaration’s attention to space cooperation is equally significant. BRICS members have agreed to deepen cooperation through the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation and have discussed reducing asymmetries in space capabilities. It also recognises the need to address space debris and ensure the long-term sustainability of outer-space activities.
For India, such cooperation can support disaster management, agriculture, climate monitoring, maritime security and resource mapping. It can also strengthen the technological capabilities of developing countries. Yet space cooperation must remain peaceful and transparent, particularly as the boundary between civilian and military space technologies becomes increasingly blurred.
The same principle applies to green development. The summit theme placed resilience and sustainability at the centre of BRICS cooperation. Members need to reconcile rapid economic growth with energy transition, climate adaptation and environmental protection. This will require affordable finance, technology transfer, resilient infrastructure and recognition of different national development pathways.
Developing countries are justified in opposing unfair climate-linked trade restrictions. But BRICS members must also demonstrate credible domestic action on renewable energy, energy efficiency, pollution control and biodiversity conservation. A fairer global climate regime should not become an excuse for delaying necessary national reforms.
The Road Ahead
The New Delhi Declaration is best understood as a political framework rather than a completed programme of action. Its success will depend on whether BRICS can translate broad commitments into measurable outcomes.
Five priorities deserve attention.
First, BRICS must strengthen its institutional capacity. An expanded grouping cannot rely exclusively on annual summits and ministerial meetings. It requires professional coordination, monitoring of commitments, stronger working groups and transparent reporting on implementation.
Second, economic cooperation should focus on practical measures. Interoperable payment systems, local-currency financing, customs coordination, trade facilitation and investment guarantees are more valuable than ambitious but vague declarations about a new financial order.
Third, BRICS must develop a credible mechanism for conflict prevention and mediation. Its members have influence in several regions, but their competing interests often limit collective action. A modest platform for preventive diplomacy, humanitarian coordination and peacebuilding could be more effective than attempts to formulate a common position on every crisis.
Fourth, the group must preserve the voice of smaller and less powerful members. Expansion should not turn BRICS into a platform dominated by China, Russia or any other major power. The credibility of its Global South agenda depends on inclusiveness, transparency and sensitivity to the concerns of African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean partners.
Finally, BRICS must avoid becoming defined only by opposition. Resistance to unilateral sanctions, tariffs and Western dominance may create unity, but a durable international coalition must also present constructive alternatives. It should offer better development finance, fairer technology access, reliable trade rules, responsible AI governance and practical solutions to climate and health challenges.
The New Delhi Summit demonstrated that consensus remains possible even among countries divided by history, ideology and strategic interest. It also demonstrated that consensus is often achieved through ambiguity, calibrated language and the postponement of difficult disagreements. That is not necessarily a weakness. Diplomacy frequently begins with the creation of common ground.
But common ground must eventually become common action. The New Delhi Declaration has given BRICS a renewed political vocabulary: multipolarity, strategic autonomy, equitable representation, local-currency cooperation, technological inclusion and development-centred multilateralism. Whether these ideas reshape global governance will depend on institutional follow-through.
For India, the summit was an opportunity to establish itself as a responsible and influential voice of the Global South. New Delhi showed that it could engage simultaneously with competing powers, protect its national priorities and help an enlarged BRICS speak with one voice. The larger challenge is to sustain that role without allowing BRICS to become either an anti-Western bloc or an ineffectual forum of slogans.
The 18th BRICS Summit therefore marks neither the emergence of a new world order nor the decline of the existing one. It represents something more gradual but potentially more durable: the continuing effort of emerging economies to negotiate greater voice, autonomy and fairness in a fragmented international system. The New Delhi Declaration is a beginning. Its real significance will be determined by what BRICS does after the applause has faded.
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The summit was held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, under the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” The declaration reaffirmed the grouping’s commitment to sovereign equality, solidarity, inclusiveness, dialogue and consensus, while emphasising cooperation across its three established pillars—political and security cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
Yet the importance of the summit lies as much in what the declaration says as in what it carefully avoids saying. BRICS remains a coalition of countries with different political systems, strategic alignments, economic interests and interpretations of international law. It includes India and China, whose bilateral relationship remains marked by unresolved tensions; Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which have been positioned differently on West Asian conflicts; Russia, which remains deeply opposed to Western strategic and economic policies; and several countries that maintain close relations with the United States and Europe.
The New Delhi Declaration therefore represents a carefully negotiated balance. It articulates opposition to unilateralism without becoming a formal anti-Western manifesto, condemns terrorism without turning the document into an indictment of any particular state, and addresses West Asian conflicts without assigning responsibility in language that would have made consensus impossible. The diplomatic achievement is real, but so are the limitations.
Consensus in a Fragmented World
BRICS was established in 2009 as a platform for cooperation among major emerging economies. Its original members—Brazil, Russia, India and China—were joined by South Africa in 2010. The group has since expanded to include countries from West Asia, Africa and Asia, making it more representative of the developing world but also more difficult to manage politically.
Expansion has increased BRICS’s geographical and economic significance. It has also deepened internal diversity. The group is no longer a compact association of four major emerging economies with broadly comparable objectives. It now represents a much wider range of development models, regional interests and foreign-policy orientations. As a result, consensus cannot be assumed merely because members share dissatisfaction with the existing international order.
The failure of BRICS foreign ministers to issue a joint statement in May 2026 had underlined these difficulties. Differences between Iran and the UAE, particularly over the language relating to West Asian tensions, threatened to expose the limits of the organisation’s consensus-based model. The eventual agreement in New Delhi followed intensive negotiations, with diplomats reportedly working until the early hours of the summit day
In this context, the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration is important for three reasons.
First, it prevented the perception that an expanded BRICS was incapable of collective political communication. A failure to adopt a declaration would have strengthened the argument that the group is too heterogeneous to become an effective force in world affairs.
Second, it preserved the principle that BRICS decisions are based on consultation rather than coercion. Consensus allows smaller and less powerful members to retain a voice, even when the group includes major powers with much greater economic and military capabilities.
Third, it demonstrated India’s ability to act as a bridge-builder. New Delhi’s diplomatic challenge was to retain the strategic autonomy of BRICS while preventing the grouping from being reduced to an instrument of confrontation with the West.
The declaration’s language on reforming global governance reflects this balancing act. It calls for a more democratic, representative, legitimate and accountable international system and stresses the need to increase the participation of emerging and developing countries in global decision-making. It also calls for reform of the United Nations Security Council and supports the aspirations of Brazil and India for a greater role in the UN, including the Security Council. China and Russia reiterated their support for the aspirations of Brazil and India.
For India, this is diplomatically valuable. Support from China and Russia for India’s claim to a larger role in global governance strengthens New Delhi’s argument that its demand is not merely a Western-backed proposal but part of a broader Global South aspiration. At the same time, the declaration invokes the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration, thereby recognising Africa’s demand for permanent representation in the Security Council.
However, the declaration does not resolve the central political problem: Security Council reform requires the consent of existing permanent members and a complex amendment process. BRICS can create diplomatic pressure, but it cannot by itself deliver institutional reform. The real test will be whether member countries can coordinate their positions in UN negotiations rather than merely repeat general principles at summits.
Multilateralism and Strategic Autonomy
The New Delhi Declaration emerges at a time when global institutions face a crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness. The United Nations has struggled to prevent wars or enforce international law consistently. The World Trade Organization’s dispute-settlement system remains weakened. The Bretton Woods institutions continue to reflect power structures created in a very different economic era.
The declaration therefore criticises the under-representation of emerging and developing economies in global institutions. It calls for reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so that voting shares, leadership positions and decision-making structures better reflect contemporary economic realities. It also demands greater regional diversity and more meaningful participation of developing countries in senior positions within international organisations.
This is a long-standing BRICS position, but its urgency has increased. Developing countries have faced the effects of debt distress, high interest rates, food and energy insecurity, climate-related disasters and disruptions to global supply chains. Yet their influence over the institutions that shape the global financial system remains limited.
The declaration’s support for a stronger and more representative multilateral system is therefore justified. But BRICS must also confront an internal contradiction. Its members themselves differ sharply on questions of sovereignty, human rights, intervention, territorial disputes and the interpretation of international law. A coalition that opposes the unequal application of global rules must demonstrate that its own conduct is guided by consistent principles.
This does not mean that BRICS must become a political alliance with a single ideology. Its strength has always been its diversity. But the group needs a minimum normative framework based on respect for sovereignty, opposition to aggression, peaceful dispute resolution, protection of civilians and adherence to international humanitarian law. Without such consistency, its call for a fairer global order may be dismissed as an attempt to replace one form of power politics with another.
India’s approach of strategic autonomy is particularly relevant here. New Delhi has sought to maintain constructive relations with the United States and Europe while also participating actively in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other non-Western platforms. This is not a contradiction. India’s objective is to preserve decision-making space in a multipolar world.
The New Delhi Summit allowed India to present itself as a country capable of engaging across geopolitical divisions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s interactions with the leaders of Iran, China, ASEAN and African countries reflected this effort to combine strategic autonomy with diplomatic outreach. The summit also created space for a bilateral meeting between Iran and the UAE, reportedly their first such interaction since the intensification of hostilities.
India’s credibility as a bridge-builder, however, will depend on sustained diplomacy beyond the summit. Consensus achieved through carefully drafted language is only the beginning. Mediation requires follow-up mechanisms, confidence-building measures and a willingness to engage with difficult disagreements.
Trade, Finance and Local Currencies
The economic dimension of the declaration is perhaps more consequential than its political language. BRICS countries are increasingly concerned about the use of tariffs, sanctions and financial restrictions as instruments of geopolitical pressure. The declaration condemns unilateral coercive measures that are contrary to international law and criticises tariffs and non-tariff barriers that undermine the predictability of global trade.
It also opposes protectionism presented in the language of environmental policy, particularly when climate-related trade measures become discriminatory or punitive. This is a significant concern for developing countries, which fear that carbon border measures and technical standards may function as disguised barriers to their exports.
The declaration’s response is not to propose isolation from the global economy. Instead, it supports reform of the WTO and the restoration of a functioning, two-tier dispute-settlement mechanism. This is a constructive position. A rules-based trading system is particularly important for developing countries because it limits the ability of powerful economies to impose arbitrary restrictions.
At the same time, BRICS is seeking to reduce its vulnerability to Western financial systems. The declaration encourages greater use of local currencies for trade and investment and supports the development of faster, cheaper, safer and more accessible cross-border payment arrangements. It also encourages the New Development Bank to expand local-currency financing and diversify its sources of funds.
The declaration does not announce a common BRICS currency. This is a sensible decision. A shared currency would require deep financial integration, coordinated monetary policies, open capital accounts, substantial mutual trust and a stable institutional framework. These conditions do not currently exist among BRICS members.
A more realistic approach is to develop interoperable payment systems, promote direct currency settlement where feasible, establish stronger financial messaging arrangements and expand local-currency lending. Such incremental steps could reduce transaction costs and the impact of sanctions without seeking to replace the dollar overnight.
However, de-dollarisation is easier to announce than to implement. The dollar’s continued centrality is supported by the depth and liquidity of US financial markets, the convertibility of the currency, the global role of American institutions and the reliability of payment and settlement systems. BRICS members also have significant differences in exchange-rate regimes, capital controls and macroeconomic stability.
Local-currency trade will therefore grow gradually and selectively. It will be most practical in sectors where bilateral trade is substantial and relatively balanced. Where trade is highly unequal, one country may accumulate large quantities of another member’s currency without having sufficient opportunities to use it. The creation of credible clearing arrangements and deep local-currency financial markets will be essential.
The New Development Bank can play a useful role. Its ability to finance infrastructure and sustainable-development projects in local currencies can help reduce currency risks for borrowers. But the bank must maintain high standards of governance, transparency and financial discipline if it is to become a credible alternative source of development finance.
Security, Terrorism and West Asia
The declaration’s security language reflects both India’s priorities and the wider instability of the international environment. It calls for dialogue, preventive diplomacy and peaceful settlement of disputes. It expresses concern about rising military expenditure, nuclear risks and attacks on civilian infrastructure and safeguarded nuclear facilities.
The statement also condemns terrorism in all its forms and specifically denounces the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025, in which 26 people were killed. It identifies cross-border movement of terrorists, terrorist financing and safe havens as major concerns, and calls for zero tolerance and an end to double standards in counter-terrorism.
This is an important diplomatic gain for India. New Delhi has consistently argued that the international community must recognise the specific threat posed by cross-border terrorism and hold not only perpetrators but also their sponsors and facilitators accountable. The inclusion of the Pahalgam attack in a consensus BRICS document gives greater international visibility to India’s position.
Yet implementation remains the central challenge. BRICS includes countries with different assessments of armed groups, resistance movements and national-liberation struggles. The declaration’s rejection of double standards is meaningful only if members apply the principle uniformly. Counter-terrorism cooperation must also respect international human rights law and avoid becoming a justification for indiscriminate measures against civilian populations.
West Asia was the most sensitive issue at the summit. The declaration expresses concern over the escalation of tensions, urges maximum restraint and calls for dialogue and diplomacy. It also stresses the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, the preservation of energy flows and the smooth movement of trade and shipping.
On Gaza and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the declaration adopts strong language. It calls for a ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access and an end to forced displacement. It condemns attacks on civilians, healthcare facilities and other civilian infrastructure, as well as the use of starvation as a method of warfare. It supports the two-state solution, with a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.
This position reflects the broad consensus among BRICS members and much of the Global South. It also demonstrates that BRICS is not merely an economic grouping concerned with tariffs and payment systems. It seeks to influence debates on war, humanitarian law and global peace.
Nevertheless, the document’s careful avoidance of naming individual actors reveals the limits of consensus diplomacy. While this may have been necessary to secure agreement among members with competing regional relationships, it reduces the clarity of political accountability. A declaration that condemns general principles but avoids identifying violations may preserve unity while weakening its deterrent effect.
The correct response is not to abandon consensus but to supplement it with practical diplomacy. BRICS could support humanitarian coordination, mediation efforts, reconstruction financing, protection of maritime routes and independent monitoring of ceasefires. Its role will be judged less by the strength of its language than by the concrete assistance it provides to conflict-affected societies.
Technology, Development and Sustainability
The New Delhi Declaration also reflects the changing agenda of international cooperation. Artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, space technology, health security and sustainable development occupy a prominent place alongside traditional questions of war and trade.
On artificial intelligence, BRICS seeks wider access to AI resources while stressing safety, security, inclusiveness, reliability, energy efficiency and trustworthy governance. The declaration places particular emphasis on the needs of the Global South and welcomes India’s hosting of the AI Impact Summit in February 2026.
This is an important area for India. AI governance is currently being shaped by a small number of technologically advanced countries and large corporations. Developing countries risk becoming consumers of systems designed elsewhere, without adequate influence over standards, data governance, intellectual-property rules or the distribution of economic benefits.
BRICS can contribute by promoting open research, affordable computing access, responsible data-sharing, multilingual AI systems and capacity-building. However, cooperation must not remain rhetorical. Member countries should develop common principles on safety testing, algorithmic accountability, privacy, cybersecurity and access to critical infrastructure.
The proposal for a BRICS repository on digital public infrastructure is another notable initiative. India’s experience with digital identity, payments and public-service delivery has attracted interest across the developing world. Sharing interoperable and adaptable digital solutions can help member countries improve financial inclusion, health services, education and welfare delivery.
But digital public infrastructure also raises risks relating to surveillance, exclusion, data protection and cybersecurity. The export of platforms must therefore be accompanied by strong safeguards, independent oversight and respect for national circumstances.
The declaration’s attention to space cooperation is equally significant. BRICS members have agreed to deepen cooperation through the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation and have discussed reducing asymmetries in space capabilities. It also recognises the need to address space debris and ensure the long-term sustainability of outer-space activities.
For India, such cooperation can support disaster management, agriculture, climate monitoring, maritime security and resource mapping. It can also strengthen the technological capabilities of developing countries. Yet space cooperation must remain peaceful and transparent, particularly as the boundary between civilian and military space technologies becomes increasingly blurred.
The same principle applies to green development. The summit theme placed resilience and sustainability at the centre of BRICS cooperation. Members need to reconcile rapid economic growth with energy transition, climate adaptation and environmental protection. This will require affordable finance, technology transfer, resilient infrastructure and recognition of different national development pathways.
Developing countries are justified in opposing unfair climate-linked trade restrictions. But BRICS members must also demonstrate credible domestic action on renewable energy, energy efficiency, pollution control and biodiversity conservation. A fairer global climate regime should not become an excuse for delaying necessary national reforms.
The Road Ahead
The New Delhi Declaration is best understood as a political framework rather than a completed programme of action. Its success will depend on whether BRICS can translate broad commitments into measurable outcomes.
Five priorities deserve attention.
First, BRICS must strengthen its institutional capacity. An expanded grouping cannot rely exclusively on annual summits and ministerial meetings. It requires professional coordination, monitoring of commitments, stronger working groups and transparent reporting on implementation.
Second, economic cooperation should focus on practical measures. Interoperable payment systems, local-currency financing, customs coordination, trade facilitation and investment guarantees are more valuable than ambitious but vague declarations about a new financial order.
Third, BRICS must develop a credible mechanism for conflict prevention and mediation. Its members have influence in several regions, but their competing interests often limit collective action. A modest platform for preventive diplomacy, humanitarian coordination and peacebuilding could be more effective than attempts to formulate a common position on every crisis.
Fourth, the group must preserve the voice of smaller and less powerful members. Expansion should not turn BRICS into a platform dominated by China, Russia or any other major power. The credibility of its Global South agenda depends on inclusiveness, transparency and sensitivity to the concerns of African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean partners.
Finally, BRICS must avoid becoming defined only by opposition. Resistance to unilateral sanctions, tariffs and Western dominance may create unity, but a durable international coalition must also present constructive alternatives. It should offer better development finance, fairer technology access, reliable trade rules, responsible AI governance and practical solutions to climate and health challenges.
The New Delhi Summit demonstrated that consensus remains possible even among countries divided by history, ideology and strategic interest. It also demonstrated that consensus is often achieved through ambiguity, calibrated language and the postponement of difficult disagreements. That is not necessarily a weakness. Diplomacy frequently begins with the creation of common ground.
But common ground must eventually become common action. The New Delhi Declaration has given BRICS a renewed political vocabulary: multipolarity, strategic autonomy, equitable representation, local-currency cooperation, technological inclusion and development-centred multilateralism. Whether these ideas reshape global governance will depend on institutional follow-through.
For India, the summit was an opportunity to establish itself as a responsible and influential voice of the Global South. New Delhi showed that it could engage simultaneously with competing powers, protect its national priorities and help an enlarged BRICS speak with one voice. The larger challenge is to sustain that role without allowing BRICS to become either an anti-Western bloc or an ineffectual forum of slogans.
The 18th BRICS Summit therefore marks neither the emergence of a new world order nor the decline of the existing one. It represents something more gradual but potentially more durable: the continuing effort of emerging economies to negotiate greater voice, autonomy and fairness in a fragmented international system. The New Delhi Declaration is a beginning. Its real significance will be determined by what BRICS does after the applause has faded.
