Overweight and weak: On the UN, the 81st session of the UN General Assembly

Editorial-26/09/2026

Overweight and weak: On the UN, the 81st session of the UN General Assembly

The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has opened at a moment when the organisation’s credibility is under severe strain, with rising conflicts, great-power rivalries and institutional paralysis exposing the gap between the UN’s founding ideals and contemporary realities. At 81, the UN appears “overweight and weak” — bloated in structure, diluted in authority, and increasingly unrepresentative of a multipolar world.

Background: The 81st UNGA in context

The 81st session of the UNGA, which began on 8 September 2026 and will run until 7 September 2027, carries the theme: “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations That Delivers for All”. The session is being presided over by Khalilur Rahman of Bangladesh, who took over from outgoing president Annalena Baerbock.
This year is symbolically significant for multiple reasons:

It is the final full session under UN Secretary-General António Guterres, whose tenure has been marked by overlapping crises — from the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to climate disasters, pandemics and the rapid rise of artificial intelligence.
Global military spending has approached $3 trillion, even as development assistance has fallen sharply and progress on several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has stalled.
The session coincides with growing calls for Security Council reform, especially the demand for permanent African representation after eight decades of exclusion.
It also comes as the world begins the process of selecting the next UNSG, who will be expected to drive institutional reform over the next decade.Yet, despite the high rhetoric on “restoring trust”, the 81st session has been overshadowed by familiar patterns of division, absence and confrontation.

Why “overweight”? Structural bloat and representational deficits

The description of the UN as “overweight” refers less to its budget than to its institutional architecture, which has expanded without commensurate gains in effectiveness or legitimacy.
Expansion without proportional power

The UN has grown from 50 founding members in 1945 to 193 today, yet its core decision-making bodies — especially the Security Council — remain frozen in a post–World War II configuration.
The Security Council’s five permanent members (P5) — the US, Russia, China, the UK and France — still wield veto power, allowing narrow national interests to override collective security imperatives.
Major regions such as Africa, Latin America and large parts of Asia lack permanent representation, making the Council appear anachronistic and unrepresentative.

Proliferation of bodies, dilution of impact

Over decades, the UN system has spawned numerous agencies, programmes, funds, special envoys and high-level panels. While many perform vital technical and humanitarian work, the overall system has become:

Top-heavy and bureaucratic, with overlapping mandates and coordination challenges.
Process-oriented rather than outcome-oriented, with success often measured in resolutions passed rather than problems solved.
Vulnerable to donor-driven agendas, where funding priorities of a few wealthy states disproportionately shape global priorities.

This structural bloat makes the UN appear “overweight” — capable of producing endless declarations, but struggling to act decisively when it matters most.

Why “weak”? Erosion of authority in a fractured world

The “weakness” of the UN stems from its inability to enforce its own Charter, prevent major wars, or meaningfully constrain powerful states.
Wars in breach of the Charter
The frequency and intensity of conflicts today are the highest since World War II, with recent studies indicating over 65 active conflicts, many involving direct or proxy engagement by major powers. Key examples include:

The Russia–Ukraine war, where the Security Council has been paralysed by vetoes and counter-accusations.
The Gaza conflict, marked by massive civilian casualties, contested interpretations of international humanitarian law, and repeated vetoes blocking ceasefire resolutions.
Escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, including US–Iran confrontations and threats of broader regional war.

In each case, the UN has been reduced to a spectator or humanitarian responder, rather than a decisive peacemaker.

Nuclear threats and unilateral sanctions

The 81st session unfolded against a backdrop of:

Renewed nuclear rhetoric, including veiled threats and modernisation of arsenals by nuclear-armed states.
The use of unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions by powerful countries, often without Security Council authorisation, undermining the principle of collective decision-making.
Selective enforcement of international law, where similar actions by different states are treated differently depending on geopolitical alignments.

These trends erode the normative authority of the UN and signal that power politics still trump rules-based order.

Paralysis in the Security Council

The Security Council’s inability to act on major crises has become routine:

Vetoes by P5 members routinely block resolutions on Syria, Ukraine, Gaza and other flashpoints.
Even when resolutions pass, enforcement mechanisms are weak; the UN has no standing army and relies on member states’ political will and resources.
The Council’s credibility suffers when it appears to legitimise some interventions while condemning others, based more on alliances than on consistent legal principles.

This paralysis reinforces the perception that the UN is strong on rhetoric, weak on resolve.

The 81st session: Missed opportunities and troubling signals

The 81st UNGA’s high-level week illustrated both the potential and the limits of multilateralism in its current form.

Absences and confrontational rhetoric

Several developments underscored the session’s shortcomings:

Key leaders directly involved in major conflicts — including those tied to Ukraine, Gaza and the Persian Gulf — either failed to offer concrete peace proposals or used the platform for accusatory rhetoric.
US President Donald Trump, addressing the Assembly, spoke of the potential “annihilation” of Iran and defended US actions in Venezuela, reinforcing perceptions of unilateralism.
The Iranian president labelled the US and Israel as “murderers, terrorists, and assassins”, further polarising the atmosphere.
Russia’s president was absent, and the Palestinian delegation was denied entry by the US, raising questions about host-country obligations and the inclusiveness of the UN’s premier forum.

Such episodes highlight how the UNGA can become a stage for geopolitical theatre rather than a space for genuine problem-solving.

The Partnership for Multilateralism (P4M) initiative

Amid this discord, an important initiative emerged:

The Partnership for Multilateralism (P4M), spearheaded by the European Union and co-sponsored by India and several other countries, seeks to transcend superpower dominance and revitalise a rules-based order anchored in the UN Charter.
P4M emphasises diplomacy, dialogue, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

However, at the 81st session, P4M was largely overshadowed by great-power confrontations, reflecting the difficulty of advancing principled multilateralism in a polarised environment.

India’s strategic dilemma

For India, the 81st session carried particular significance:

Bangladesh’s Khalilur Rahman, as UNGA president, will preside over the process of selecting the next UNSG, making South Asia’s role more visible.
India has launched a bid for a second non-permanent seat on the Security Council for 2028–29, underscoring its ambition to be a leading voice in global governance.
Yet, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not address the UNGA this year and skipped several key multilateral summits on the sidelines, shortly after hosting the Delhi BRICS Summit.

While domestic priorities may have dictated this choice, India’s absence at a critical juncture — when the future direction of multilateralism and UNSG selection are at stake — represents a missed opportunity to shape the narrative on UN reform and global order.

The deeper crisis: Trust deficit and legitimacy gap

At its core, the “overweight and weak” critique points to a crisis of trust and legitimacy.

Public trust in decline

UNGA President Khalilur Rahman himself acknowledged that:

The UN’s 80 years of survival is not, by itself, proof of success.
To rebuild public trust, the organisation must confront “hard truths” about its shortcomings, including its inability to prevent wars, ensure equitable development, or represent the Global South adequately.
Global military expenditure continues to rise, while development assistance has fallen by 23% year-on-year, even as one-third of SDG targets show stalled or regressing progress.

When citizens see the UN unable to stop wars, protect civilians, or deliver on promises of sustainable development, confidence in multilateralism erodes.

Representational deficit

The legitimacy of any international organisation depends on how representative and inclusive it is perceived to be.

The absence of permanent African representation in the Security Council after eight decades is increasingly viewed as a moral and political anomaly.
Emerging powers such as India, Brazil, Germany and Japan — which contribute significantly to peacekeeping, development and global public goods — remain outside the P5.
Small and medium states often feel that decisions affecting them are made by a handful of powerful countries, with the UN merely ratifying outcomes.

This representational deficit feeds narratives that the UN is a vehicle for great-power hegemony rather than a genuine platform for collective problem-solving.

Reform imperatives: From cosmetic changes to structural transformation

The 81st session’s theme of “Managing Transformation” is apt, but transformation must go beyond slogans and incremental adjustments.

Security Council reform

Any credible reform agenda must begin with the Security Council:

Expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership to reflect 21st-century geopolitical realities, including permanent seats for Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Restraint or abolition of the veto, at least in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and mass atrocities, to prevent single-country blockage of action.
Clearer criteria and procedures for authorising the use of force, to reduce selective enforcement and perceptions of double standards.

Without Security Council reform, other changes risk being superficial.

Strengthening the General Assembly

The UNGA, where every member state has one vote, can be empowered to:

Play a greater role in setting global priorities and holding the Security Council accountable through regular reviews of its functioning.
Enhance its capacity for early warning and conflict prevention, working more closely with regional organisations.
Institutionalise mechanisms for civil society, scientific communities and the private sector to contribute to UN deliberations, particularly on issues like AI, climate and public health.

Operational efficiency and accountability

To shed its “overweight” image, the UN system must:

Streamline overlapping mandates, merge redundant bodies, and improve inter-agency coordination.
Introduce stronger performance metrics and accountability mechanisms, linking funding and mandates to measurable outcomes.
Reduce bureaucratic inertia by embracing digital governance, data-driven decision-making and agile management practices.

Financing for development and climate

Given the stall in SDG progress and climate urgency:

Development finance architectures must be reformed to mobilise greater resources for the Global South, including through multilateral development banks and innovative financing mechanisms.
Climate finance commitments must be scaled up and delivered predictably, with enhanced support for adaptation, loss and damage, and just energy transitions.
The UN should play a stronger role in coordinating global public investment in health, education, food security and digital infrastructure.

India’s role: Between aspiration and responsibility

India’s relationship with the UN encapsulates both the promise and the predicament of contemporary multilateralism.

India’s credentials and ambitions

India brings significant assets to global governance:

It is among the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping, with a long record of participation in missions across continents.
As a major developing economy, it champions the concerns of the Global South on climate justice, equitable trade and technology access.
Its civilisational ethos and constitutional commitment to peaceful coexistence align closely with the UN Charter’s principles.

India’s bid for a non-permanent Security Council seat (2028–29) and its long-standing aspiration for a permanent seat reflect its desire to shape global rules rather than merely follow them.

Strategic choices ahead

However, India’s approach must evolve from participation to leadership:

It should use its diplomatic capital to build coalitions around concrete reform proposals, especially on Security Council expansion and veto restraint.
On issues like terrorism, climate change and digital governance, India can offer normative frameworks that balance security, development and rights.
Regular, high-level engagement at the UNGA and related summits is crucial; absence at pivotal moments can be interpreted as disengagement at a time when India seeks greater responsibility.

The P4M initiative, co-sponsored by India, signals a willingness to defend a rules-based order even amid great-power rivalry. Translating this into sustained diplomatic momentum will be key.

Way forward: Reclaiming the UN’s promise

The 81st session’s sobering message is clear: the UN cannot continue as a museum of 1945 in a 2026 world. To remain relevant, it must undergo deep structural reform, not just managerial tweaks.
Critical steps include:

Security Council expansion and veto reform to restore credibility and representativeness.
Empowering the General Assembly and other bodies to act more decisively on conflict prevention, development and climate.
Strengthening the UN’s normative authority by ensuring consistent application of international law, irrespective of power asymmetries.
Enhancing inclusivity, by giving greater voice to the Global South, youth, women, scientists and civil society in UN processes.
Aligning resources with priorities, ensuring that development and climate financing match the scale of global challenges.

The selection of the next UNSG offers a once-in-a-decade opportunity to set the tone for this transformation. The world needs a Secretary-General who can combine moral clarity, diplomatic skill and reformist courage to steer the UN through an era of polycrisis.

Conclusion

The 81st session of the UNGA has laid bare the UN’s paradox: it is simultaneously indispensable and inadequate. Indispensable, because no other forum can convene virtually all nations to address cross-border challenges; inadequate, because it remains hobbled by outdated structures, great-power vetoes and a widening trust deficit.
Describing the UN as “overweight and weak” is not a call to abandon multilateralism, but a clarion call to reform it. The choice before the international community is not between the UN and some alternative global order, but between a reformed, representative and effective UN and a continued drift towards fragmentation, conflict and injustice.
For India and other aspiring powers, the imperative is to move beyond rhetorical support for multilateralism and actively shape the architecture of a renewed UN — one that can deliver on its founding promise of peace, dignity and opportunity for all.

Download Pdf

Student Login

Request Submitted!